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Abstract
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly
own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private con-
tributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a
complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering func-
tions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a
legitimate upper bound should be reduced. Combining that property
with eﬃciency and robustness properties with respect to changes in
the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on
a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences.
Keywords: fairness, excludable non-rival good, welfare egalitarianism,
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
We consider an economy where a non-rival good can be produced from a
private good. A group of agents own the production technology in common
and each of them is endowed with a (relatively large) quantity of the private
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1good. Exclusion, perhaps partial, is possible: diﬀerent agents may consume
diﬀerent quantities of the non-rival good. If we are interested in eﬃciency
and equity, how should we choose the production level of the non-rival good,
the consumption levels of the agents, and their private good contributions?
To answer this question, one may construct allocation rules. An allo-
cation rule speciﬁes which feasible allocations are the most desirable as a
function of the parameters of the problem, namely, the production technol-
ogy and the agents’ preferences over bundles of non-rival and private goods.
Examples of this approach include Foley (1970), Mas-Colell (1980), Moulin
(1987, 1992), and Sprumont (1998). Quite naturally, all these papers impose
Pareto eﬃciency, which immediately rules out exclusion.
Alternatively, one may look for social ordering functions specifying a com-
plete ranking of all allocations, feasible or not, as a function of the parame-
ters of the problem. That approach is adopted in Maniquet and Sprumont
(2002), and we follow it here too. Because of a variety of information and
incentive constraints, or because of other political or legal restrictions, the
set of achievable allocations in often very uncertain and may have almost
any shape. If a full ordering of the conceivable allocations is available, a best
allocation may be selected from virtually any set. In particular, it is pos-
sible to choose among allocations where agents are partially excluded from
consuming the non-rival good. This is useful because partial exclusion helps
alleviate the free-rider problem, as Moulin (1994) demonstrates.
The literature on allocation rules has identiﬁed a number of interesting
normative principles that can be adapted to our approach. Particularly rel-
evant to our analysis is the “Unanimity Upper Bounds” axiom proposed by
Moulin (1992) and used by Sprumont (1998) to characterize a particular
welfare-egalitarian rule. Let us deﬁne the unanimity (welfare) level of an
agent to be the level she would enjoy at an eﬃcient allocation if the others
had the same preferences as hers and everyone was treated equally. In the
non-rival environment we are considering, disagreeing constitutes a social
burden in the sense that the unanimity welfare levels are not jointly feasible
when preferences diﬀer. The Unanimity Upper Bounds axiom requires that
everyone take up a share of this burden: no agent’s welfare should exceed
her unanimity level.
In this paper, we extend the Unanimity Upper Bounds principle to social
ordering functions. We propose the following “Excessive Welfare Transfer
Principle”. Suppose that an agent enjoys an “excessive” welfare level, that
is, a level exceeding her unanimity level. Then, a private good transfer from
2her to an agent whose welfare is lower than his unanimity level should be
viewed as a social improvement. This principle expresses a form of welfare
inequality aversion, but a rather limited one. We study social ordering func-
tions which satisfy that property and other more standard eﬃciency and
robustness conditions.
Three conclusions may be drawn from our work. First, the Excessive
Welfare Transfer Principle is compatible with a large range of properties. It
can be combined with eﬃciency properties and with properties of robustness
to changes in the preference proﬁle or in the set of agents. On the other hand,
it is incompatible with another equity property, called Free Lunch Aversion,
which was the central axiom in Maniquet and Sprumont (2002).
Second, combining the Excessive Welfare Transfer Principle with proper-
ties of eﬃciency and robustness with respect to changes in the agent set
precipitates an inﬁnite aversion towards excessive welfare. Removing an
arbitrarily large quantity of private good from the bundle allocated to an
“excessive welfare” agent, and transferring an arbitrarily small fraction of it
to an agent whose welfare is not excessive, must be regarded as a social im-
provement. It is worth noting that related derivations of other extreme forms
of welfare inequality aversion were obtained by Fleurbaey (2001), Maniquet
and Sprumont (2002) and Maniquet (2002).
Third, our axioms pin down a speciﬁc class of egalitarian, or maximin,
social ordering functions. Those social ordering functions maximize the wel-
fare of the worst-oﬀ agent calibrated along multiples of the cost function.
Maximizing any of those social orderings subject to the technological feasi-
bility constraints yields the allocation rule characterized by Sprumont (1998).
Maniquet and Sprumont (2002) identiﬁed a diﬀerent class of egalitarian so-
cial ordering functions where welfare is measured in terms of the equivalent
free consumption of the non-rival good; maximizing those orderings yields
the rule characterized by Moulin (1987).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We deﬁne the model in
the following section and introduce the axioms in section 3. Some important
implications of the axioms are proved in section 4. Section 5 is devoted to
the presentation and discussion of our main result. All proofs are gathered
in section 6.
32S e t u p
One non-rival good can be produced from one private good. The cost function
C : R+ → R+ is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and C(0) = 0. The set
of all cost functions is denoted by C.T h eagent set N is a ﬁnite nonempty
set of integers. The set of all agent sets is denoted by N.Apreference for
agent i ∈ N is a binary relation Ri over bundles zi =( xi,y i) ∈ R × R+ which
is complete, transitive, continuous, strictly increasing in the non-rival good
consumption level yi, strictly decreasing in the private good contribution level
xi, and convex. We let Pi and Ii denote the corresponding strict preference
and indiﬀerence relations, respectively. We often write i instead of {i} and
ij instead of {i,j}. The set of all preferences is denoted by R.
An economy is a list E =( N,R,C), where N ∈ N, R ∈ RN,a n dC ∈ C.
We call R a preference proﬁle. Formally, R is a mapping from N to R.T h u s ,
for any R0 ∈ R, R−1(R0): ={i ∈ N : R(i)=R0} denotes the set of agents
whose preference is R0. For every S ⊂ N, RS is the restriction of R to S.
We often abuse our notation, however, and let RS denote also the list of
preferences assigned to S by R, i.e., we write RS instead of R(S). Similarly,
we use both Ri and R(i) to denote agent i’s preference. We refer to a pair
(N,R)a sasociety and let n = |N|.
An allocation (for the economy E)i sam a p p i n gz ∈ (R×R+)N specifying
a bundle z(i) for each agent i ∈ N.W e o f t e n w r i t e zi =( xi,y i)i n s t e a do f
z(i)a n dzS =( xS,y S) instead of z(S). An allocation z is admissible (for the
society (N,R)) if there exists a production level y such that, for each i ∈ N,
(0,y) Ri zi Ri (0,0).
The ﬁrst part of this condition says that no agent prefers her bundle to the
opportunity of consuming any quantity of the non-rival good for free. The
second part means that everyone gets a non-negative share of the surplus
generated by the production of the non-rival good. We denote the sets of ad-
missible allocations by Z(N,R). We also write Z(Ri) instead of Z({i},R {i}).
Our formulation allows diﬀerent agents to consume diﬀerent quantities of
the non-rival good at an admissible allocation: exclusion, complete or par-
tial, is possible. Furthermore, an admissible allocation z =( x,y)n e e dn o tb e
feasible for E, that is, it may violate the constraint
P
i∈N xi ≥ C(maxi∈N yi).
A social ordering (for E) is a complete and transitive binary relation
deﬁned over the set of all admissible allocations, Z(N,R). A social ordering
function R assigns to each economy E as o c i a lo r d e r i n gR(E). Thus, z R(E)
4z0 means that the allocation z is at least as good as z0 in the economy E.
Similarly, we use P(E)a n dI(E) to denote strict social preference and social
indiﬀerence.
3A x i o m s
This section deﬁnes the four properties that we impose on social ordering
functions. An arbitrary economy E =( N,R,C)i sﬁxed throughout. We
b e g i nw i t hab a s i ce ﬃciency condition requiring that if all agents ﬁnd an
allocation at least as good as another, so does society. This property is
weaker than the traditional strong version of the Pareto principle because it
never forces strict social preference.
Unanimity Let z,z0 ∈ Z(N,R). Then, {ziRiz0
i for all i ∈ N} ⇒ {z R(E)
z0}.
Our next two axioms are properties of robustness of the social ordering
with respect to changes in the set of agents. Separability is a familiar con-
dition in welfare economics (see for instance Fleming (1952)) and in social
choice (see d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977)), requiring that agents who are
indiﬀerent between two alternatives do not inﬂuence social preferences over
these alternatives. Our version of the axiom, due to Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2001), focuses on agents who receive the same bundle in two allocations. It
demands that removing or adding such agents do not modify the social or-
dering of such allocations.
Separability Let z,z0 ∈ Z(N,R). Let S ⊂ N and suppose that zN\S = z0
N\S.
Then, {z R(E) z0} ⇔ {zS R(S,RS,C) z0
S}.
Our third axiom, Replication Invariance, requires that the social ranking
of two allocations be preserved in any economy obtained by merely replicating
agents and rescaling the cost function. Some notation is needed to make
this statement precise. If r is a positive integer, an r-replica of a society
(N,R)i sa n ys o c i e t y( N0,R 0)s u c ht h a t|R0−1(R0)| = r|R−1(R0)| for every
R0 ∈ R. This condition implies, in particular, that |N0| = r|N| = rn.
A replica of (N,R) is any society which is an r-replica of (N,R)f o rs o m e
r. We use a similar terminology for economies and allocations. Thus, an
economy E0 =( N0,R 0,C0)i sa nr-replica of E =( N,R,C)i fi )( N0,R 0)
is an r-replica of (N,R)a n di i )C0 = rC. If z ∈ Z(N,R), an allocation
5z0 ∈ Z(N0,R 0)i sa nr-replica of z if, for all R0 ∈ R,a l li ∈ R−1(R0)a n d
i0 ∈ R0−1(R0),z(i)=z0(i0). We will often use the symbol r.E to denote an
arbitrary r-replica of an economy E, and r.z to denote an arbitrary r-replica
of an allocation z.
Replication Invariance Let r be a positive integer, and E0 = r.E an r-
replica of E. Let z, z0 ∈ Z(N,R) and let r.z, r.z0 ∈ Z(N0,R 0) be r-replicas
of z and z0 respectively. Then, {z R(E) z0} ⇒ {r.z R(r.E) r.z0}.
Finally, we conclude with a formal statement of the Excessive Welfare
Transfer Principle discussed in the introduction. We deﬁned the unanimity
welfare level of an agent, say, i, to be the level she would enjoy at an eﬃ-
cient allocation if the others shared her preference and everyone was treated
equally. Observe that this unanimity level depends only upon i’s preference,
the number of agents in the economy, and the cost function: it is obtained by
maximizing Ri subject to C/n. Consider now an allocation where i’s welfare
is below her unanimity level while some other agent j’s welfare is above his
unanimity level. A transfer of private good from i to j should decrease social
welfare. Formally, if Ri ∈ R and C ∈ C,l e tz∗
i(Ri,C) be the best element
of Ri under C, that is, the unique bundle zi =( xi,y i)s u c ht h a txi ≥ C(yi)
and z0
iRizi for every z0
i =( x0
i,y 0
i)s u c ht h a tx0
i ≥ C(y0
i). Our axiom reads as
follows.
Excessive Welfare Transfer Principle Let z,z0 ∈ Z(N,R) and let i,j ∈
N. Suppose that zN\ij = z0
N\ij,y i = y0
i,y j = y0
j and xi + xj = x0
i + x0





j(Rj,C/n)} ⇒ {z P(E) z0}.
4 Some implications
T h eE x c e s s i v eW e l f a r eT r a n s f e rP r i n c iple is the only equity axiom in our
list. In conjunction with the other axioms, however, it implies other equity
properties. Two such properties are established in the lemmata below, which
constitute the building blocks for our main theorem in the next section.
In income inequality measurement theory, the Pigou-Dalton transfer prin-
ciple requires that an income transfer from a rich agent to a poorer agent be
considered a social improvement (provided the latter agent remains poorer
than the former). This principle is compatible with any degree of income
inequality aversion (see Chakravarty (1990)). In our richer model where in-
come can no longer be equated with welfare, the Excessive Welfare Transfer
6Principle is one of several plausible extensions of the Pigou-Dalton princi-
ple. As such, it is compatible with any degree of welfare inequality aversion.
But quite interestingly, combining it with our other axioms precipitates an
extreme form of welfare inequality aversion captured in the following condi-
tion. Here and throughout the section, an arbitrary economy E =( N,R,C)
is again ﬁxed.
Excessive Welfare Aversion Let z,z0 ∈ Z(N,R) and let i,j ∈ N. Suppose







We stress that this condition is a drastic strengthening of our original
Excessive Welfare Transfer Principle. It regards as a social improvement any
arbitrarily small welfare gain obtained by an agent below her unanimity level
at the expense of a potentially very large welfare loss by an agent above his
unanimity level.
Lemma 1 If a social ordering function satisﬁes Unanimity, Separability,
Replication Invariance, and the Excessive Welfare Transfer Principle, then
it satisﬁes Excessive Welfare Aversion.
The second equity property that we derive from our axioms is a variant
of the fundamental idea that equals should be treated equally. Agents are
said to be equals if they have the same preferences; such agents are said to
be treated equally if they receive bundles they deem equivalent. Consider
now the following extension of the equal treatment condition: if two agents
with identical preferences receive bundles on diﬀerent indiﬀerence curves,
increasing the welfare of the worse-oﬀ agent and reducing that of the other
agent is a social improvement, as long as the latter remains at least as well-oﬀ
as the former.
Inequality Aversion among Equals Let z,z0 ∈ Z(N,R) and let i,j ∈ N.
Suppose that Ri = Rj and zN\ij = z0
N\ij. Then, {z0
jPizjRiziPiz0
i} ⇒ {z P(E)
z0}.
Lemma 2 If a social ordering function satisﬁes Unanimity, Separability,
Replication Invariance, and the Excessive Welfare Transfer Principle, then
it satisﬁes Inequality Aversion among Equals.
75 Cost-calibrated welfare egalitarianism
It turns out that the axioms introduced in section 3 force us to use a very
speciﬁct y p eo fs o c i a lo r d e r i n gf u n c t i o n s :allocations must be ranked accord-
ing to the “cost-calibrated” welfare of the worst-oﬀ agent. To make this
statement precise, we introduce a last piece of notation.
For each preference Ri and every cost function C, denote by a0(Ri,C)
the largest number a for which Ri’s best bundle subject to the cost function
C/a involves no production: a0(Ri,C)=s u p {a>0:( 0 ,0) Ri (C(yi)/a,
yi)f o ra l lyi ∈ R+}, with the convention that sup∅ =0 . For each a>0,
deﬁne the set Γ(a)={(xi,y i) ∈ R × R+ : xi ≥ C(yi)/a}, and let Γ(0) :=
{(xi,0) : xi ≥ 0} and Γ(∞): ={(0,y i):yi ∈ R+}. The restriction of Ri to
the subset of admissible bundles admits a unique numerical representation
u(Ri,C,.):Z(Ri) → R such that
max
zi∈Γ(a)
u(Ri,C,z i)=a for all a ≥ a0(Ri,C).
We call the number u(Ri,C,z i)a g e n ti’s cost-calibrated welfare level at bun-
dle zi.B yd e ﬁnition of this number, agent i is indiﬀerent between receiving
the bundle zi or maximizing Ri subject to the cost function C/u(Ri,C,z i).
This is illustrated on Figure 1. Note that u(Ri,C,(0,0)) = a0(Ri,C)a n d
u(Ri,C,(0,y)) →∞as y →∞ .
A social ordering function R is a cost-calibrated maximin function if, for
each economy, the ordering of allocations it prescribes is consistent with the
application of the maximin criterion to the vectors of cost-calibrated welfare
levels generated by these allocations. More precisely: for any E =( N,R,C)
and all z, z0 ∈ Z(N,R),
min
i∈N




i) ⇒ z P(E) z
0.
A prominent example is the cost-calibrated leximin function RL. Let <n
L
denote the usual leximin ordering of Rn
+ :f o ra n yw,w0 ∈ Rn
+,w<n
L w0 if and
only if the smallest coordinate of w is greater than the smallest coordinate of
w0, or they are equal but the second smallest coordinate of w is greater than
the second smallest coordinate of w0, and so on. The social ordering function
RL ranks the admissible allocations for any given economy by applying the
leximin ordering to the corresponding vector of cost-calibrated welfare levels:
for any E =( N,R,C)a n dz, z0 ∈ Z(N,R),
z RL(E) z







8Theorem The cost-calibrated leximin function RL satisﬁes Unanimity, Sep-
arability, Replication Invariance, and the Excessive Welfare Transfer Princi-
ple. Conversely, every social ordering function satisfying these four axioms
is a cost-calibrated maximin function.
Before we turn to the proof, a brief discussion of this result may be useful.
1) In the classical literature on the maximin and leximin criteria, indi-
vidual utilities are given ap r i o r i : see, for instance, Hammond (1976). By
contrast, no utility information is given in our model. The leximin criterion
could therefore be applied to any utility representation of individual prefer-
ences. The signiﬁcance of the second part of the theorem is therefore twofold:
not only do our axioms lead us to rank allocations by applying the maximin
criterion to vectors of corresponding welfare levels, they also force us to use
a speciﬁc (endogenous) welfare measure based on the cost-calibrated repre-
sentation of preferences.
2) The two statements in our theorem are not exact converse to each
other. On the one hand, RL is not the only social ordering function satis-
fying the four stated axioms. Other examples include functions that agree
with RL whenever the latter does not declare a tie between two allocations,
but do break some such ties. Consider an economy E =( N,R,C)a n da n
admissible allocation z. For every agent i, the deﬁnition of the cost-calibrated
numerical representation of Ri ensures that ziIiz∗
i(Ri,C/u(Ri,C,z i)). Denote
by y∗
i(Ri,C/u(Ri,C,z i)) the quantity of the non-rival good in the bundle
z∗
i(Ri,C/u(Ri,C,z i)). Deﬁne the social ordering function R0
L as follows: for
every economy E and any two admissible allocations z,z0, let z R0
L(E) z0 if









n))). It is not diﬃcult to verify that R0
L satisﬁe so u rf o u ra x i o m s .T h i se x -
ample may be modiﬁed to obtain a social ordering function that satisﬁes the
axioms but disagrees with some of the strict preferences recommended by
RL.
On the other hand, not all cost-calibrated maximin functions satisfy
our four axioms. For instance, a cost-calibrated maximin function which
breaks ties between allocations by preferring the one where the highest cost-
calibrated welfare is lower, violates Unanimity.
3) The four axioms stated in the theorem are independent.
9A social ordering function satisfying all of them but Unanimity is the
following dual of the cost-calibrated welfare leximin function: ﬁrst minimize
the largest cost-calibrated welfare level; in case of a tie, minimize the second
largest, and so on.
If Separability is not required, we may use a numerical representation of
preferences that depends not only on the cost function, C, but also on the
number of agents, n.F o ra n yn u m b e ra, let Λ(C,n,a)={(xi,y i) ∈ R × R+ :
xi ≥ (C(yi)/n) − a}. Note that Λ is replication-invariant: Λ(rC,rn,a)=
Λ(C,n,a) for any positive integer r. Deﬁne the numerical representation
v(Ri,C,n,.):z(Ri) → R of preference Ri by the condition that maxzi∈Λ(C,n,a)
v(Ri,C,n,z i)=a. Rank allocations in the economy (N,R,C) by applying
the leximin criterion to the vectors of welfare levels generated through this
new representation.
If Replication Invariance is not imposed, apply the leximin criterion to
numerical representations that depend on C in such a way that they coincide
with the cost-calibrated representations u(Ri,C,.) only on those bundles zi
for which u(Ri,C,z i)=1 /n for some integer n.
Finally, a social ordering function satisfying all axioms but the Exces-
sive Welfare Transfer Principle is the non-rival good welfare leximin function
deﬁned in Maniquet and Sprumont (2002). It compares allocations by ap-
plying the leximin criterion to the vectors of “non-rival good welfare” levels.
If Ri ∈ R and zi ∈ Zi(Ri), agent i’s non-rival good welfare from bundle zi is
deﬁned as the unique number y0
i ∈ R+ such that ziIi(0,y 0
i).
4) In addition to the properties stated in the theorem, the cost-calibrated
welfare leximin function RL possesses many others. For instance, it satisﬁes
the inter-proﬁle condition of “Responsiveness”, which requires that a social
preference for an allocation z over an allocation z0 be preserved if all agents’
upper contour sets at (the bundle they receive at) z shrink while their up-
per contour sets at z0 expand. For a discussion of inter-proﬁle conditions
in economic models, see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996) or Le Breton and
Weymark (2001).
On the other hand, RL violates a property of welfare inequality aversion
introduced in Maniquet and Sprumont (2002) under the name of “Free Lunch
Aversion”. Consider an allocation at which two agents, i and j,c o n s u m e
the same quantity of the non-rival good. Suppose that i’s private good
contribution is positive but j’s contribution is negative. Since j already
enjoys a “free lunch”, a transfer of private good from i to j should be deemed
10to decrease social welfare. Formally:
Free Lunch Aversion Let E =( N,R,C) be an arbitrary economy, z =
(x,y),z 0 =( x0,y 0) ∈ Z(N,R), and i,j ∈ N. Suppose that yi = yj,y = y0,
xN\ij = x0
N\ij, and xi + xj = x0
i + x0
j. Then, {0 ≤ xi <x 0
i and x0
j <x j ≤
0} ⇒ {z P(E) z0}.
That RL violates Free Lunch Aversion, however, is only a consequence of a
more fundamental incompatibility. No social ordering function satisﬁes Free
Lunch Aversion and the Excessive Welfare Transfer Principle. Figure 2 shows
an economy E =( {1,2},R,C) and two allocations z,z0 ∈ Z ({1,2},R)s u c h
that i) y1 = y0
1 = y0
2 = y2, ii) x1+x2 = x0
1+x0
2, iii) x1 <x 0
1 ≤ 0 ≤ x0





2(R2,C/2). By Free Lunch Aversion,
z0 P(E) z, whereas the opposite strict social preference is implied by the
Excessive Welfare Transfer Principle.
6P r o o f s
We begin by noting an obvious but useful consequence of Unanimity: for all
E =( N,R,C)a n df o ra l lz,z0 ∈ Z (N,R), {zi Ii z0
i for all i ∈ N} ⇒ {z I(E)
z0}. We call this property Unanimous Indiﬀerence.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .Let R satisfy Unanimity, Separability, Replication In-
variance, and the Excessive Welfare Transfer Principle. Suppose, by way
of contradiction, that R violates Excessive Welfare Aversion. Let E =













0 R(E) z. (2)
By Unanimous Indiﬀerence, we may assume that yi = y0
i and yj = y0
j. By
strict monotonicity of preferences, x0
i >x i and x0
j <x j.
Let r be a positive integer large enough to guarantee that
z
0
j Pj zj Pj z
∗
j(Rj,rC/(rn+1 ) ) . (3)









































Construct E2 =( N2,R 2,rC) by adding to society (N1,R 1)o n ea g e n t ,s a y ,0 ,
endowed with the preference R0 constructed above. Formally, N2 = N1∪{0}
(so that the original agent set N is a subset of N2),R 2










There are rn + 1 agents in the economy E2 and the cost function is rC.
Combining (3), (6) and (5), we may therefore use the Excessive Welfare























0,(r − 1).zj,r.z N\j),













0)/r, yi). By (4) and strict monotonicity of Ri,
ziPiz00
i . Therefore, recalling that zN\ij = z0











In view of (1) and (6), and since there are rn agents in the economy E3, this
contradicts the Excessive Welfare Transfer Principle.
The following simple observation will be used in the two remaining proofs.
Let E =( N,R,C) be an arbitrary economy and let I,J be two nonempty
disjoint subsets of N. Let z,z0 ∈ Z(N,R) be such that zN\(I∪J) = z0
N\(I∪J). If
a choice function R satisﬁes Excessive Welfare Aversion, then {z∗
i(Ri,C/n)
12Pi zi Pi z0
i for all i ∈ I and z0
j Pj zj Pj z∗
j(Rj,C/n)f o ra l lj ∈ J} ⇒ {z P(E)
z0}. We omit the formal proof of this fact, which merely consists in applying
the axiom repeatedly.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Let R satisfy Unanimity, Separability, Replication
Invariance, and the Excessive Welfare Transfer Principle. By Lemma 1, R
also satisﬁes Excessive Welfare Aversion. Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that R violates Inequality Aversion among Equals. Let E =( N,R,C),









0 R(E) z. (9)
In (8), we may assume without loss of generality that zjPizi. Indeed, if
zjIizi, our assumptions on preferences guarantee that there exists a bundle ti
such that zjPitiPiz0
i. Unanimity and (9) then ensure that z0 R(E)( zN\i,t i),
and we need only replace z with (zN\i,t i) in the argument below. Now, since








Clearly, we may assume that s ≥ 2. It is convenient to distinguish two cases.
Case 1: r =1 .
If s<n ,c h o o s eS ⊂ N such that i,j ∈ S and |S| = s. By Separability
and (9), z0
S R(S,RS,C) zS. In view of (10), this contradicts Excessive Welfare
Aversion since r =1 .
If s ≥ n, choose S ⊇ N such that |S| = s. Let R00
S\N ∈ RS\N and
z00
S\N ∈ Z(S\N,R00




S\N), which again contradicts Excessive Welfare Aversion.
Case 2: r>1.
Let E0 =( N0,R 0,C0)b ea nr-replica of E such that i,j ∈ N0. By Replica-




i. Using the observation preceding the proof
of Lemma 2, we may now repeat the argument in Case 1 with N0,R 0,C0,r.z,
and r.z0 playing the roles of N,R,C,z, and z0, respectively.
P r o o fo ft h eT h e o r e m . The proof that RL satisﬁes our four axioms is
straightforward; we establish here the second part of our theorem. Let thus
13R satisfy Unanimity, Separability, Replication Invariance, and the Excessive
Welfare Transfer Principle. By lemmata 1 and 2, R also satisﬁes Excessive
Welfare Aversion and Inequality Aversion among Equals.
Now, let E =( N,R,C)a n dz,z0 ∈ Z(N,R) be such that
min
i∈N





Suppose, contrary to the claim, that
z
0 R(E) z. (12)
We will derive a contradiction.
Assume, without loss of generality, that mini∈N u(Ri,C,z0
i)=u(R1,C,z0
1).
To alleviate notations, let us write ui instead of u(Ri,C,.) for every i ∈ N.
Thus, ui(zi) >u 1(z0
1)f o ra l li ∈ N. Because of Unanimity, we need only





ui(zi)f o ra l lj ∈ N\1. (13)
This is without loss of generality. Indeed, if (13) does not hold, we simply
choose t,t0 ∈ Z(N,R) such that i) ui(t0
i) ≥ ui(z0
i)a n duj(tj) ≤ uj(zj) and ii)
the conditions obtained from (11) and (13) by replacing z with t and z0 with
t0 are satisﬁed. By Unanimity, t0 R(E) z0 and z R(E) t, so that by (12) and
transitivity of R, t0 R(E) t. We may then merely replace z0 with t0 in the
argument below.
Let p,q be two positive integers such that
min
i∈N
ui(zi) >q / p>u 1(z
0
1). (14)
We may and do choose p,q > n. Let E0 =( N0,R 0,C0)b eap-replica of
E such that N ⊂ N0. There are pn agents in this economy, and C0 = pC.




where p.z, p.z0 ∈ Z(N0,R 0)a r ep-replicas of z and z0 respectively. Choose
now z000
1 ∈ Z(1,R 1)a n dz00
N\1 ∈ Z(N\1,R N\1) such that
ui(zi) >u i(z
00
i ) >q / p>u 1(z
000
1 ) >u 1(z
0
1)f o ra l li ∈ N\1. (15)
14Such allocations exist by continuity of the preferences. The construction of
z000
1 and z00
N\1 is illustrated in Figure 4, where i ∈ N\1.
Construct an economy E1 =( N1,R 1,C1) by “adding” to society (N0,R 0)
a disjoint 1-replica of society (N\1,R N\1). Formally, N1 is the union of
N0 and some disjoint agent set M, R1
N0 = R0, (M,R1
M) is a 1-replica of






1)( p.z , 1.z
00
N\1), (16)
where we recall that p.z, p.z0 ∈ Z(N0,R 0)a n dw h e r e1 .z00
N\1 ∈ Z(M,R1
M)i s
a 1-replica of the allocation z00
N\1 ∈ Z(N\1,R N\1). By Inequality Aversion
among Equals, and recalling (13) and (15), the better allocation in (16) can
be improved upon by replacing the bundle of every agent i with zi,e x c e p t
for p “replicas” of agent 1. Formally, choosing a set N1
1 ⊆ (R1)−1(R1) ⊂ N1
of cardinality |N1
1| = p, we have
(p.z
0








1)i sap-replica of z0




1)i sa( p+1)-replica of zN\1. Construct now an economy E2 =( N2,R 2,C2)
from E1 by “removing p replicas” of each i ∈ N\1. Formally, N2 = N1
1 ∪
(N\1),R 2 = R1













N\1 ∈ Z(N\1,R 2










because (14) and the deﬁnition of 1 imply that u1(z1) >q / p>u 1(z0
1), so
that (15) yields u1(z1) >u 1(z000
1 ).
Now, either p+n−1 >qor p+n−1 ≤ q. In the former case, construct




1| = q −n+1, and let N3 = N3
1 ∪(N\1),
R3 = R2
N3, and C3 = C2. There are exactly q agents in the economy E3.
(Note that 0 <p−q+n−1 <pbecause we chose p,q > n.) By Separability,
((q − n +1 ) .z
0
1 ,z N\1) R(E










1). But recalling the deﬁnition






i(Ri,C3/q) for all i ∈ N/1.
According to the observation preceding the proof of Lemma 2, and since
q = |N3|, (18) contradicts Excessive Welfare Aversion.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ep+n−1 ≤ q, construct E4 =( N4,R 4,C4)f r o mE2 by
“adding q −p−n+1 replicas” of an arbitrary agent, say, agent 1. Formally,
N4 is the union of N2 with some disjoint set L, R4
N2 = R2, and R4
L(i)=R1
for all i ∈ L,a n dC4 = C2. Again, there are q agents in this economy. Giving
to all agents in L t h es a m eb u n d l ez0 and applying Separability, we get from
(17) that
((q − p − n +1 ) .z0 ,p . z
0
1,z N\1) R(E





which again contradicts Excessive Welfare Aversion.
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